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If the grand design of the Manmohan Singh government is to forge peace with Pakistan as a liberating step in our sub-continental rivalry, India should surely be more understanding of Pakistani sensitivities in Afghanistan and its larger paranoia. Can a nation which has been done in once in the past, of course largely by its own blunders but also with some strategic help from India (the creation of Bangladesh), afford on its Western borders a government which is seen to be kowtowing to India?
Much of this haranguing about strategic depth is nothing but a desperate desire in Pakistan for a friendly dispensation on its West, so that it is free from the fear of being destabilized from the rear. India’s good friend Hamid Karzai himself has alluded to the reality of the triangular matrix by describing Afghanistan and Pakistan as “conjoint twins” with India being a mere “friend.” In the dance for influence and power, therefore, why not gracefully allow the “twin” a larger role? Unless of course there are overwhelming compulsions of national interest, in which case we must recognize the prevalent hardball, take necessary risks and act with far greater persuasion and resolve so as to apply soft and hard power in an appropriate mix to get a foothold in the emerging power dynamic.
The problem with India’s posture is that we seem to be shying away from the existing realities and simply hoping that economic engagement alone will secure our interests. It takes some strategic innocence to aspire for influence in a country as dangerous, conspiratorial and bloody as Afghanistan, without being willing to muddy our boots. And it is plainly ridiculous to expect Mr. Jayant Prasad and a lone military attaché to match the power and guile of Jallaluddin Haqqani and Shuja Pasha. If we seek greater influence in Afghanistan, we need to recognize the salience of military drivers therein and leverage our capacities accordingly. And if we are unwilling or unable to do so, simply and gracefully stay out. The reason we seem to be falling in between two stools is because we seek influence while being unwilling to take attendant risks (reiterating our resolve to stay engaged times without number, without spelling out as to how precisely we shall secure our interests).
India’s engagement in Afghanistan has been based on a set of soft choices – economic, infrastructural, developmental and humanitarian assistance (an estimated 4000 Indians are involved in the reconstruction effort with an investment of 1.3 billion dollars) with security guarantees coming from the Karzai government and its infantile tools. We eschewed a more deterministic military role for ourselves, even though short of direct military committal we could have done much more to shape the security dynamic in Afghanistan. We could have opted for greater involvement – through some direct military diplomacy and a broad based training commitment for instance (a stake in the planned training of 300,000 ANA/ANP personnel by 2013 is of course a gargantuan challenge but also a huge opportunity), so that we had friends, linkages and far greater leverage in the emerging security framework, but we chose not to.
There were many who had cautioned against the adoption of this effete strategic outlook, whereby, even as we kept on enlarging our civilian engagement we did not do enough to shore up attendant security concerns, but we hung on to our bravado. There were others who advocated keeping channels open with some elements in the Taliban leadership but their calls went unheeded, defying not only common sense but also mathematical logic. The Taliban, it bears reiteration, represents the Pashtuns – the single largest ethnic identity in Afghanistan numbering about 40 million – how can you simply refuse to do business with such a numerically significant entity?
Today, many liberal Pashtuns complain that India did not back them strongly enough. Of course, the choices were never and are still not easy, with each of the major players being a bundle of contradictions – Karzai is reportedly doing a deal with Pakistan because he feels that India did not put its weight behind him with sufficient resolve, the Taliban is grateful that India did not intervene militarily but openly claims responsibility for the recent attack in Kabul alleging RAW presence, and our natural ally (the United States) does not want us in because of fear of inviting Pakistani wrath. But the Pakistanis and the Americans were faced with similarly difficult choices – yet they did assert themselves and muscled their way in. In contrast, India was simply not assertive enough, a perception now publicly reinforced by the likes of Moridian Dawood, Advisor to the Afghan Foreign Minister, who has said, “India seems apologetic about its presence. It’s a regional player and must behave like one, instead of insisting on a benign presence with a penchant for staying in the background.”
By design, or more accurately by conscious drift, therefore, we conceded the strategic initiative to Pakistan. We took the burden of a good democracy to Afghanistan, but as is our wont forgot to under gird it with force (not merely its combat dimension, but its numerous softer nuances). Pakistan, on the other hand, chose to pay with blood and leveraged its role in targeting the Afghan Taliban in hideouts on its side of the border with skill. From accused (terror epicentre) it turned approver and is now using arrests of key Taliban leaders (Mullah Baradar) to further muscle its way into the emerging power structure in Afghanistan. It has also deftly nuanced its counter terror response – decisive contest with the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba) and selective engagement with the Afghan Taliban, while continuing to aid and abet the LeT and Jaish as foreign policy tools along its Eastern borders.
With regard to the broader situation, there are of course huge difficulties, but there is also the faint glimmer of hope. The United States has done a great deal and will continue to remain engaged over the next 12 to 18 months in seeking military ascendancy over the Taliban. The fear that America will cut costs and run does sound a little unreal – having invested so much in blood and treasure it will stay for a while, and an early exit will come about only if America begins to cede the military initiative.
If it continues with its military ascendancy as seems to be the case now, Obama will be empowered to prolong the American stay (public support for the American involvement in Afghanistan is already growing). The exit time table is more in the nature of a warning to others to get their act together, since the Americans cannot be expected to stay forever. Efforts are on under the stewardship of Maj. Gen. Richard Barrons to lure away the second tier leadership of the Taliban and peel away the hard core fighters by offering them jobs and cash (250 dollars a month as against 300 dollars on offer by the Taliban).
In a few years from now, Afghanistan could begin to resemble today’s Iraq – restive, violent, not greatly democratized but not entirely anarchic either. Operation Mushtarak aimed at capturing the drug stronghold – Marjah, and despite the recent Taliban fightback in Musa Qala this may turn out to be the Fallujah moment in Afghanistan (not as bloody but possibly as decisive). If the trend continues in Kandahar (Operation Omaid is due to begin in June) and then in Eastern Afghanistan where the all powerful Jalaluddin Haqqani is ensconced in the provinces of Khost, Pakyta, Pakhtiar and Gardez, the halo of invincibility shrouding the Taliban may begin to disappear.
We do seem to have got it wrong – staying engaged as reiterated by the National Security Adviser and even by the Prime Minister, is of course a symbol of our altruistic resolve, but whether it reflects strategic acuity or even level headed pragmatism is another matter. Afghanistan was a test case for our foreign policy resolve – an arena where while leveraging other tools of foreign policy, use of instruments of force and military diplomacy/intelligence should have been predominant.
But that would have meant a paradigm shift in our foreign policy construct, leading to a greater role for the military. It was easier therefore to deflect by jumping to the usual conclusions about use of force not being an option – the various reasons being trotted out do seem to be frivolous. The end state in Afghanistan will soon reflect the pusillanimous reality, because in life as in diplomacy you reap as you sow. While we may continue to gain goodwill, we will soon be faced with the prospect of waning influence in the evolving power structure and little security for our civilian presence. Closer home, we may be faced with a qualitatively upgraded terror threat – the ISI/LeT could use surrendered Taliban cadres to bring the menace of deadly suicide bombers to our door step (revelations in the ongoing Headley saga which document his linkages with elements of the Al Qaeda in North Waziristan point to the rather ominous possibilities of collusion).
Even at this late stage there is a need to seriously review our options. We lack the necessary military presence and leverage with the security establishment in Afghanistan to secure our interests. Hamid Karzai is simply not in a position to guarantee our security. It may be more prudent to roll back our civilian engagement, unless we wish to lose more civilian lives. Merely pumping in more and more CRPF personnel in defensive rings will be of little help in a country where we have no penetration in the central facets of the security dynamic and no worthwhile military presence, such defensive rings can be easily breached – especially by seasoned rogues from the ISI.
We also need to ponder over our broader approach – instead of going down the familiar road of preachiness/talking down to Pakistan (repeatedly describing it as a state whose creation was fundamentally flawed, a failed/failing state, etc.) and indulging in endless diplomatic gobbledygook without accompanying resolve, we need to change tone and tenor and become less patronising while quietly undergirding our own response with far greater acuity and resolve. It may also be useful if we were to revisit the utility and wisdom of some of our own polemical rhetoric.
We need to acknowledge that Pakistan may be a troubled state in many ways but it is neither failed, nor failing. Given its peculiar dynamic it is indeed a smart survivor with an uncanny knack of leveraging its benefactors (the Americans and the Chinese) with particular finesse. We must also avoid the easy temptation of churlishly finding fault for many of our own failings in the persona of the Pakistan Army – the number of people in Delhi’s seminar circuit who needlessly spit venom on the Pakistan military as the mother of all evils is indeed incredible. “Kashmir is merely an obsession with the Pakistan Army, the ordinary Pakistani does not care,” is the frequent assertion. Really? Last week, prominent Pakistani media personality Hamid Mir (who is no friend of the Pakistan military establishment), when asked by CNN-IBN as to what was the central obstacle in India-Pakistan relations, simply stated “Kashmir.”
We need to acknowledge this reality. Sample some of the responses to the recently concluded Strategic Dialogue in Washington. As soon as news came that Kayani and Shuja Pasha would attend, we saw a spate of Pakistan military bashing once again. Strategic Dialogues are a great deal about matters military – so if Generals Kayani and Shuja Pasha represented the Pakistani delegation, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman JCS, represented the Americans. That is the global practice. If our own horribly antiquated practices don’t reflect the same, we need to make amends and not curse the Pakistan military.
Anyway, while there is little we can do about the US-Pakistan or Sino-Pakistan engagements, there is a great deal we can do ourselves – strengthening our counter terror response domestically, making sure we have viable military response options in the event of another Mumbai (well thought through, swift and decisive), restoring our greatly eroded conventional military edge, enhancing the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, initiating long pending organizational and structural defence reforms in the absence of which we shall continue to field an impaired military capability. This will be far more useful than the endless parroting of strategic nonsense like “force is no option”. Strategic Restraint lies in holding back despite the capacities and not in indulging in a lengthy exchange of dossiers since you neither have the capacities nor the resolve. While the former will inspire respect and may even deter, the latter is more likely to provoke fresh bouts of adventurism (especially when your thresholds are being monitored by smart cookies like Kayani and Shuja Pasha who sense weakness in our predilection to hum and haw).
Unfortunately, while this country has an extremely astute and sagacious political leadership, our National Security Management Structures (those that proffer options and advice) are held hostage to the Indian Foreign Service which may be extremely adept at leveraging diplomacy but has little understanding of instruments of force and their nuanced utilities. So when the odd opportunity does arise to graft the two in the interest of Indian statecraft they choke. Afghanistan is an instructive case in point. The absence of cross cultural inputs and a viable military dynamic in our foreign policy construct is the most serious handicap in our statecraft.
A good way to begin might lie in designating somebody with a sound strategic mind and an understanding of the military dynamic as the Special Envoy to Afghanistan – it could be a Lt. General from the Army or somebody like C. Raja Mohan. Such an arrangement will be a welcome departure from the present practice of an extended swaddle (the Ambassador, Special Envoy and key appointments in the National Security Council are exclusively IFS) presenting the political leadership with the usual rigmarole – the same suspects producing the same stereotyped views. But will our combative turf warriors ever be able to place national interest before their own?
Or, will our political class summon the nerve to abandon outdated tenets of civilian control and seek direct, unfettered, professional military advice on matters of foreign policy while simultaneously infusing our National Security Structures with cross cultural talent? Desultory consultation (often only when the crisis erupts) must make way for intimate, prior, continuous and informed dialogue with the military and the strategic community. The resultant feed will help to develop and nurture capacities, that allow us, when confronted with challenges like Afghanistan, to apply comprehensive national power to more purposeful effect. Af-Pak and India’s Strategic Innocence
Raj Shukla, April 2, 2010
Qandahar is the second largest city in Afghanistan, with a population of 250,000. It used to be on of the most important trading cities in the landlocked country. It did have an international airport and has road connections to all major cities in Afghanista–Kabul, Herat. It can also be connected to the Pakistani city of Quetta and has links to the Central Asian republics. At the time of its glory Qandahar and hills yielded the best grapes in the world. It still exports opium.
It seems like eons agon, but in the sixties Qandahar in the middle of nowhere was a cool place to visit – hashish, hookas, hippies and hash pipes. We traveled from Europe to Pakistan in the late sixties by car. On the war we met thousands of European hippies headed out to the Eastern frontiers. The Europeans came for the fun, frolic and, for the simple bazaars of Qandhar, where they could buy what no European supermarket could offer them. They came for the exotic mosques (like the Mosque of the sacred Cloak) in the city which included ancient relics–containing the cloak worn by the Prophet Mohammed.
That was several decades ago. Today Qandhar is known as terror central in the world.
Qandhar was founded by Alexander the Great two thousand five hundred years ago. The word Qandhar (or the Americanized Kandhar) is a corruption of Alexander or Sikandar, as he is known in these part.
Qandahar has been fought over by the Persians, the Turks, and the Mongols. The British occupied the city breifly in 1839 (to lose it in 1842). It again occupied it it 187, but lost it again in 1881.
The Cold war was fought right here in Qandhar. All through the 80s, which the West enjoyed peace and prosperity, Pakistan and Afghanistan were in the middle of the Cold War’s fiercest hot battles. Eventually when the Rohrabakcker sponsopred, and CIA trained Taliban prevailed in 1994, they were welcomed enthusiastically in the city of grapes and hashish.
Qandhar was the first city to be attacked by the Americans in 2nd Afghan war. Today the city is on the Bharati trail of terror that extends from Tajikistan to Afghanistan and then rears its ugly head in Pakistani Baluchistan, Iranian Sistan-Balauchistan. RAW assists Junduallah from this terror base, and supports the TTP terrorists from this city.
RAW [Research and Analysis Wing] is settling scores with the ISI in Afghanistan and perhaps Baluchistan. Aqil Shah: Foreign Policy Magazine. March 2009
There is a terror network in Afghanistan. Many analysts have provided robust proof of the Bharati involvement in Afghanistan. Penury stricken Delhi didn’t spend about a Billion Dollars in Afghanistan so that the investment would eliminate the slums of Mumbai or feed the Dalits. India spent the money in Afghanistan so that it could build a base of operations against Pakistan. One of the prime directives of the RAW was to destabilize Pakistan. Asif Haroon Raja sheds light on the developments in Afghanistan and RAWs machinations in Kabul. It is run by Delhi. Officially there are only 4 Consulates and 13 “Information Centers“. But each fake “Consulate” has “Consular offices“, and each “Information center” has “Sub-sections” and “Desks”. In addition the Indian companies that are working in Afghanistan allow the Indian RAW agencies open access to the facilities and the offices. Anatomy of Indian Intelligence Services and Alliances.
We have substantiated our views via several independent sources.
I think it would be a mistake to completely disregard Pakistan’s regional perceptions due to doubts about Indian competence in executing covert operations. That misses the point entirely. And I think it is unfair to dismiss the notion that Pakistan’s apprehensions about Afghanistan stem in part from its security competition with India. Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover, India has run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Baluchistan. Kabul has encouraged India to engage in provocative activities such as using the Border Roads Organization to build sensitive parts of the Ring Road and use the Indo-Tibetan police force for security. It is also building schools on a sensitive part of the border in Kunar–across from Bajaur. Kabul’s motivations for encouraging these activities are as obvious as India’s interest in engaging in them. Christine Fair: Foreign Policy Magazine. March 2009
The “Consulates” train agents, and then send them across the border to sabotage and create general mayhem among the population. The purpose of these operations is the same as it always has been. RAW used similar facilities to bomb Pakistani cities in the 80s. It is now using the same bases for similar bloody acts of sabotage. RAW activities in varous countries in South Asia. Nepal view: RAW’s Machination In South Asia.
History is on the side of the skeptics in Afghanistan, where from Alexander the Great to the Soviets, all foreign invaders have eventually been repelledBy Richard Halloran Tuesday, Oct 14, 2008, Page 9
Some try to proclaim the the Afghan resistance is a monolith movement called “Taliban”. It is actually 38 separate movements led by a large spectrum of anti-occupation forces which also include some remnant of the old Taliban. It is ironic that the taliban created by the USA, recognized by the Saudis, the UAE and the Pakistanis were initially created by the CIA (see Congressman Rohrabakers statements on this site).
Indian Consulates in Afghansitan training terrorists and sending them to Pakistan to blow up pipelines in BaluchistanIndian diplomats and RAW officials with the help of Northern Alliance have significant ingress in the Afghan ministry of tribal affairs. They are exploiting the ministry to conduct covert activities against Islamabad and creating rifts between the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indian agents are instrumental in arranging meetings of tribal elders and Afghans with dual nationalities with Indian consulate officials in Jalalabad and assisting them in recruiting agents from Pakistan’s tribal areas for activities prejudicial to Pakistan’s interests. India’s new colony by Furzana Shaheen
Nepal view: RAW’s Machination In South Asia. Here is Hamid Mir’s current column in The News shedding light on the role of Qandhar in the terror activities in Pakistan.
I remember that many Indian journalists were shocked after reading the joint statement. They started asking me that why Balochistan is mentioned in the statement? In fact many of them were not aware like many common Indians that what is going on in Balochistan. Within a few hours I started receiving calls from many Indian TV channels that what evidence was shown by Pakistan to Manmohan Singh about the alleged Indian involvement in Balochistan? In fact the Pakistani prime minister did mention Balochistan to Manmohan Singh but he never handed over any dossier to his Indian counterpart.
The situation in Balochistan came under detailed discussion during the first meeting of the foreign secretaries in the evening of July 14 in Sharm el-Sheikh which took place two days before the meeting of Manmohan and Yousaf Raza Gilani. Pakistani foreign secretary Salman Bashir told Shiv Shankar Menon that India must delink the talks from terrorism otherwise Pakistan will be forced to produce at least “three Indian Ajmal Kasab’s” in front of international media who were directly or indirectly part of the terrorist activities in Balochistan and Pakistan will easily establish that Indian consulate in Afghan city of Kandhar is actually a control room of all the terrorist activities organised by the separatist Balochistan Liberation Army.
Salman Bashir told Indian foreign secretary that both Pakistan and India cannot afford a blame game right now. If Pakistan will come out with evidence that Indians are responsible for attacking Chinese engineers in the Gwadar port city it may damage Indian credibility on one side but it will also spread more anti-India feelings in Pakistan and extremist forces will be the ultimate beneficiaries.
Pakistan is [...]e against the Indian involvement in Balochistan insurgency in a very careful, well-calculated and “limited manner.” Recently a prominent US magazine Foreign Affairs (March 2009) published the report of a roundtable discussion on the causes of instability in Pakistan. Christine Fair of RAND Corporation clearly said in that discussion that “having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Balochistan.”
Central Asia tajikistan Pakistan with RAW trail of terrorThis allegation came from a very credible American scholar who recently visited Indian consulate in Zahedan. Now where is Zahedan? It is the capital of Iranian province Sistan-o-Balochistan bordering Pakistan. More than two million Balochis live in the Iranian side of Balochistan. Iran is building a big port of Chabahar in the same area with the active help of India. Top Iranian leaders have alleged many times that American CIA is supporting Iranian Balochis to destabilise the Islamic Republic. Famous American journalist Seymour Hersh admitted in July 2008 that Bush administration gave million of dollars to a separatist Iranian group “Jandallah” which is responsible for violence in Iranian part of Baluchistan. Balochistan and India, Wednesday, July 29, 2009, Hamid Mir
Senior US diplomat William Burns gave Indian officials a terse and cryptic directive on Thursday. ”Shut down Indian Consulates in Afghanistan, reduce presence in Kabul and stop sending mercenaries across the Durand Line.” This message was supplemented with a letter from President Barack Obama to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The message in the letter was the same. India has few options now. It can accept the US diktat or it can defy it. If Delhi defies American warnings and polite talk, then NATO and ISAF will stop providing the necessary security to the nest of spies and saboteurs known as “Consulates”. Rupee News broke the news about the letter from Presidetn Barack Obama before Indian agencies began reporting the frank and blunt message.
A US diplomat has handed India a letter from US President Barack Obama about US-Indian ties that also touched on efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan, US officials said Wednesday. Envoy Richard Holbrooke, briefing reporters on his own visit to Pakistan and Gulf Arab states last week, said US diplomat William Burns delivered the letter after arriving in Delhi overnight Tuesday but declined to divulge its contents. “This administration believes that what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan is of vital interest to our national security, and … that India is a country that we must keep in closest consultation with,” Holbrooke said. Holbrooke added that Burns, the under secretary of state for political affairs, is carrying a private presidential letter “that I would have carried if I had the time to go to Delhi on this trip but I couldn’t do it.” Obama letter handed to India amid consultations on Pak. The Nation
Shutting down the Consulates is not enough. The Bharati base in Tajikistan also has to be shut down.
Tajikistan map Indian base-Indian Consulates-dens of Inequity
Washington has publicly and privately asked Delhi to improve relations with Islamabad so that the Pakistani armed forces can concentrate on the Western borders. At this critical juncture when a US surge is going to place additional pressure on Durand Line, the Obama Administration wants Delhi to help ease the tensions and reduce the level of rhetoric. In a highly unusual step the American Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan has handed over a letter from President Obama to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. It has already been established that the meeting was about Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is widely understood in diplomatic circles that the US wants India to back off on its so called demands. The blunt message came after the U S Treasury secretary visited China and came back with Beijing’s displeasure at the continued Indian support for the TTP in Swat.
United News of India quoted unnamed sources as saying that the US had asked India to ‘close or prune down’ its consulate in Jalalabad in Afghanistan following allegations by Pakistan that it was ‘creating trouble’ in the border areas of NWFP and Balochistan.
UNI said Pakistan had alleged that the Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar were ‘fomenting trouble’ in NWFP and Balochistan bordering Afghanistan by providing financial and material support to fugitives in the two border provinces. The sources said besides asking India to resume talks with Pakistan, the US was also trying to convey to Indian authorities its views on closing or pruning the Indian Consulate in Jalalabad…. Dawn
Delhi has to tone down its rhetoric on terror. Islamabad and the world knows who is behind the TTP in Swat. If Delhi wants peace with Pakistan, it has to pull back in Afghanistan and Swat. It has to make major territorial concessions in Kashmir and the border areas. Once the border disputes have been resolved, the sky is the limit in cooperation with Pakistan. Sir Creek and Siachin have to solved and resolved quickly. Once Kashmir is resolved in accordance with the UN resolutions and the wishes of the Kashmiri people, the Pakistan government will find to problem in helping Bharat gain trans-national travel through Pakistan. However this has to be on a mutual basis which would allow Pakistani truck to reach Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. Bharat must live up to the letter and the spirit of the Indus Water treaty and begin treating Pakistanis are friends rather than enemies.
NEW DELHI: Senior US diplomat William Burns gave Indian officials a wish-list on Thursday that aims to revive India-Pakistan peace talks, assures New Delhi of its vital role in Washington’s strategy in the region, and retrieves the hope for Kashmiri people to shape their own destiny.
Local reports quoted unnamed sources as saying that the visiting US Under-Secretary of State also asked his interlocutors to trim India’s consulate in Jalalabad, which Pakistan sees as a distraction in the military campaign against Muslim extremists on the Afghan border. Dawn
There are many types of peace. It is obvious that India has neither the capacity nor the wherewithal to impose peace of the sort that exists between the Native Americans and the US government. India is not Israel and Pakistan is not the Gaza strip. If Israel with all its might could not force an unequal peace on unequal partners (Syria, Palestinians and Lebanon) it is also very obvious that Delhi cannot impose peace on Pakistan the same way. Bharat could not break up Lanka and make it Kowtow to Bharat. It cannot force Pakistan. It has to woo Pakistanis if she wants peace on her Western borders.
There is much in common between India and Pakistan, but there is much that separates the countries. Mere cultural affinity and anathema to religion cannot wish the differences away. Bharat must recognize that Pakistanis do not see Delhi as the perfect model to emulate on anything. Therefore Delhi must stop wishing for a Pakistan in its own image. There are many routes to success, and Pakistanis admire the Chinese a lot more than they admire Indians.
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